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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2013 NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
Zachary DiIonno * & Sommerset Wong **
Questions Presented
I. Does the Cush-Hook Nation, a tribe in existence since time
immemorial, maintain aboriginal title to their ancestral lands situated in
modern-day Kelley Point Park when that title has never been extinguished?
II. Does Oregon have criminal jurisdiction to regulate the use of, and to
protect, the culturally and religiously significant tribal objects belonging to
the Cush-Hook Nation when those objects are located within federal lands
and subject to federal law?
Statement of the Case
I. Statement of Facts
The Cush-Hook Nation (“Cush-Hooks” or “Nation”) is a tribe of Indians
whose original homelands are located at the confluence of the Columbia
and Willamette Rivers. ROA at 1. The Cush-Hook Nation’s permanent
village was located inside the present-day boundaries of Oregon’s Kelley
Point State Park. Id. The Nation occupied this area since time immemorial
and lived by hunting, fishing, growing crops, and harvesting wild plants,
such as wapato. Id.

* Zachary DiIonno is a 2013 alumni of the William S. Richardson School of Law at
the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. He served two years as a member of the NALSA Moot
Court team for the University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa, garnering awards for 3rd Place Best
Advocate and 3rd Place Best Brief in 2012, and 1st Place Best Brief in 2013. He also
earned a Master's Dgree in Education from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and a
Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University. He is currently a
Litigation Associate at the law firm Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing based in Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
** Sommerset Wong received her law degree, magna cum laude, from the University of
Hawai‘i William S. Richardson School of Law in 2014, where she served as the Executive
Editor for the University of Hawaii Law Review. As a member of the Native American
Moot Court Team, she was awarded First Place Best Brief in 2013 at the national
competition, and also received the John S. Edmunds Award for Civility and Vigorous
Advocacy in 2014. She graduated from The George Washington University and received
her Bachelors of Arts in Psychology with a minor in Criminal Justice in 2011, and is
currently a law clerk at Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
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On April 5, 1806, the Multnomah Indians, a neighboring tribe to the
Cush-Hook Nation, introduced William Clark of the Lewis & Clark
expedition to the chief of the Cush-Hook Nation. Id. While visiting the
Cush-Hook Nation’s village, Clark drew sketches in his journals of the
village and longhouses and recorded some ethnographic information about
Cush-Hook governance, religion, culture, housing, agriculture, burial
traditions, and hunting and fishing practices. Id. Clark also noted the tribal
shamans’ practice of carving sacred totems and religious symbols into
living trees. Id. Clark presented the Cush-Hook chief with one of the
President Thomas Jefferson peace medals that Clark and Lewis customarily
handed out to chiefs during their expedition. Id. These peace medals, also
referred to as “sovereignty tokens” by historians, were distributed to Indian
chiefs because of the political and diplomatic significance of the items. Id.
Lewis and Clark believed that an offering of these medals by the United
States to tribal leaders demonstrated a United States’ desire to engage in
political and commercial relations with tribes. Id. Essentially, the offering
of these medals represented recognition of tribal leaders and their respective
governments by the United States. Id. After Clark’s visit to the Cush-Hook
Nation’s village, the tribe continued to live in their village in this particular
area and engaged in their traditional ways of life across their territory for
next forty-four years. Id.
In 1850, the Cush-Hook Nation signed a treaty with Anson Dart
(“Dart”), the superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Oregon Territory. Id.
Dart’s focus was to displace the tribe from their land so that American
settlers could move in and occupy the valuable farming lands along the
river. Id. On behalf of the United States, Dart offered the Cush-Hook
Nation a treaty promising compensation and benefits for their lands in and
around modern-day Kelley Point Park. ROA at 2. In return, the Cush-Hook
Nation agreed to move sixty miles westward to a specific location in the
foothills of the Oregon coast range of mountains. Id.
Following the treaty signing, the entire Cush-Hook Nation relocated to
the coast range, as promised, to avoid the encroaching American settlers.
Id. In 1853, however, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Cush-Hook
treaty. Id. As a result, the United States never gave the Nation any of the
promised compensation for their lands, nor did the United States deliver
any of the other promised benefits of the treaty. Id. The United States did
not recognize the Cush-Hook Nation’s ownership of the lands they moved
to in the Oregon coast range of mountains. Id. Furthermore, since the
treaty was not ratified, and the United States has not since undertaken any
other act to “recognize” the Cush-Hooks, the Nation has remained a non-
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federally recognized tribe of Indians displaced from their original
homelands. Id.
In the same year that the Cush-Hook Nation relocated following the
treaty signing, the United States passed the Oregon Donation Land Act of
1850, which encouraged and validated white settler claims to lands in the
Oregon Territory conditioned on certain requirements. Oregon Donation
Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850); ROA at 2. The Act granted fee simple
title to “every white settler” who had “resided upon and cultivated the
[land] for four consecutive years.” § 4, 9 Stat. at 497; ROA at 2.
Joe and Elsie Meek, two American settlers, claimed the 640 acres of land
that comprised the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral lands. ROA at 2. The
Meeks did not cultivate or live upon the land for the required four years,
and thus failed to meet the conditions set forth in the Act. Id. Yet, the
Meeks received fee simple title to the land from the United States. Id. In
1880, the Meek’s descendants sold the land to the State of Oregon, which
proceeded to created Kelley Point Park (“Park”). Id.
In 2011, Thomas Captain (“Captain”), a citizen of the Cush-Hook
Nation, moved from the tribal area in the coast range of mountains to his
tribe’s ancestral homelands in Kelley Point Park. Id. Captain returned to
his tribe’s homeland to reassert his Nation’s ownership of the land, and to
protect culturally and religiously significant trees that had grown in the
Park for over three hundred years. Id. The trees are of great importance to
the Cush-Hook religion and culture because tribal shamans/medicine men
carved totem and religious symbols into living trees hundreds of years ago
when the Nation inhabited the lands prior to their displacement by the
United States. Id. This practice was noted in the journals of William Clark
during his visit in 1806. Id. Despite the fact that the carved images are at a
height of twenty-five to thirty feet from the ground, vandals have recently
begun climbing the trees to deface the images. Id. In some instances, these
thieves have cut the images off the trees to sell. Id. The state has done
absolutely nothing to stop these illegal acts. Id. To prevent further damage
to his tribe’s sacred totems and symbols, Captain occupied the Park to
protect and preserve these crucial tribal objects. In order to restore and
protect a vandalized image that had been carved by one of his ancestors,
Captain cut down the tree and removed the section of the tree that contained
the image. Id. As Captain was returning to his Nation’s location in the
Oregon coastal mountain range, state troopers arrested him and seized the
image. Id.
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II. Statement of Proceedings
The State of Oregon brought a criminal action against Thomas Captain
for violating state law by allegedly trespassing on state lands, cutting timber
in a state park without a permit, and desecrating an archaeological and
historic site. ROA at 2. The Oregon Circuit Court for the County of
Multnomah (“circuit court”) held a bench trial. ROA at 3. In its opinion,
the circuit court made the following findings of facts and conclusions of
law. Id.
The circuit court found that the Cush-Hook Nation was not a tribe
included on the 1994 list of federally recognized Indian tribes. Findings of
Fact (“FOF” hereinafter) 8. However, the court concluded that the Nation
continues to own the land in question under aboriginal title. Conclusions of
Law (“COL” hereinafter) 4. The court’s conclusion is strengthened by its
finding that expert witnesses in history, sociology, and anthropology have
established that the Cush-Hook Nation occupied, used, and owned the lands
in question before the arrival of Euro-Americans. FOF 1.
The court further found that in 1850, the Cush-Hook Nation, having
aboriginal title to the land, signed a treaty with Anson Dart, the
superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Oregon Territory in which the
Nation agreed to sell its land and relocate to a reservation in the Oregon
coast range of mountains. FOF 2. The court found that the U.S. Senate
refused to ratify this treaty, and subsequently never paid the Cush-Hook
Nation for its lands, nor did it provide the Nation with any of the promised
benefits for leaving its aboriginal territory. FOF 3. Accordingly, the court
held that because of the Senate’s failure to ratify the treaty and compensate
the Cush-Hook Nation, the Nation’s aboriginal title was never extinguished
by the United States, as required by Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823). COL 2.
Because the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land in question
was never extinguished, the circuit court concluded that Congress erred in
passing the Oregon Donation Land Act (Act) in 1850 because the Act
described the lands of the Cush-Hook Nation as being “public lands” of the
United States. COL 4. The court found that Joe and Elsie Meek applied for
and received fee title to the land that encompassed the Cush-Hook village.
FOF 4. However, the court found that the Meeks did not fulfill the
requirements of the Act because they did not live on the land for more than
two years nor did they cultivate it. FOF 5. Thus, the court held that the
Meek’s failure to meet the requirements voided ab initio the grant of fee
simple title to the Meeks and the subsequent sale of lands to the Meeks’
descendants. COL at 3.
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In 2011, vandals defaced the sacred totems in Kelley Point Park. ROA
at 2. Thomas Captain returned to the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal lands
in the Park to protect the sacred totems. Id. Captain erected temporary
housing in Kelley Point Park at the site of his Nation’s ancient village.
FOF 6. He cut down an archaeologically, culturally, and historically
significant tree containing a tribal cultural and religious symbol. FOF 7.
Subsequently, Captain was charged under Oregon state law. The circuit
court held that Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235390.240 applied to all lands in the State of Oregon under 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2012) (“Public Law 280” hereinafter), whether they were tribally owned or
not, and thus Oregon properly brought this criminal action against Captain
for damaging an archaeological, cultural, and historical object. COL 5.
The court found Captain guilty for violating Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961
(2011) and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 (2011) for damaging an
archaeological site and a cultural and historical artifact and fined him $250.
ROA at 4. However, the court held that the Cush-Hook Nation still owned
the land within the Park and found Captain not guilty for trespass or for
cutting timber without a state permit. Id.
Both the State and Thomas Captain appealed the circuit court’s decision.
Id. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision
without writing an opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
Id. The State then filed a petition and cross petition for certiorari and
Captain filed a cross petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. Id.
Jurisdictional Statement
The judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the highest court in
which a decision was made, was entered when the court affirmed the
decision of the Oregon Circuit Court for the County of Multnomah without
writing an opinion. Following the denial of writ of certiorari by the Oregon
Supreme Court, the petition for writ of certiorari with this Court was timely
filed and granted. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(2006).
Summary of the Argument
The Cush-Hook Nation has maintained its aboriginal title to the lands in
Kelley Point Park since their establishment of that title by occupancy since
“time immemorial.” The Cush-Hook Nation is a tribe that was recognized
by Lewis from the Lewis and Clark Expedition by the sovereignty tokens
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that he offered to the head chief of the Nation. See ROA at 1. At the time
of Lewis’s encounter with the Cush-Hook Nation in 1805, there was no
formal federal recognition process. Rather, United States officials used
sovereignty tokens as a means to demonstrate the United States’ interest in
establishing political and diplomatic relations with tribes. Lewis extended
sovereignty tokens, documented the Nation’s activities and established
government, which further substantiates the validity of the Cush-Hook
Nation’s aboriginal title to the land. See id. Not only did the Cush-Hook
Nation clearly establish their aboriginal title, the Cush-Hook Nation has
also retained that title to the present.
Congress has made it clear that aboriginal title can be extinguished
through conquest and purchase. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 587 (1823). However, with respect to the Cush-Hook Nation,
Congress did not take any steps to extinguish that title through either
method. The United States has and maintains a peaceable relationship with
the Nation and thus no evidence of conquest exists. As for purchase,
although the Cush-Hook Nation did enter into treaty negotiations with the
superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Oregon Territory, these negotiations
were never ratified by the United States Congress and therefore were never
valid. See ROA at 1. Further, because the United States never fulfilled the
requirements of the treaty, there was no purchase by the United States of
the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal lands. Finally, though Congress may
extinguish title by an explicit act, this was never done. United States v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941). In passing the Oregon
Donation Land Act, Congress did not explicitly extinguish aboriginal title
and therefore the title continues to remain with the Cush-Hook Nation.
The final way to extinguish a tribe’s aboriginal title to land is voluntary
abandonment by the tribe. Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437
(1917). In this case, however, the Cush-Hook Nation did not voluntarily
abandon the lands in modern-day Kelley Point Park. Although the departure
of the Cush-Hook Nation from the lands at issue in accordance with the
treaty provisions could have constituted abandonment, the treaty was never
ratified and therefore the Nation’s displacement was unlawful. Thus, not
only has the Cush-Hook Nation established aboriginal title, the Nation has
also maintained that title because its title to the lands has never been
extinguished or abandoned. For the foregoing reasons, the Oregon Court of
Appeals was correct in finding that the Cush-Hook Nation established and
maintained aboriginal title.
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Following the Cush-Hook Nation’s displacement from its original
homelands in1850, the United States passed the Oregon Donation Land Act
to encourage settlers to move to the newly “discovered” western frontier as
part of the United States’ domestic policy of “Manifest Destiny.” In order
to receive fee simple title to land, “every white settler” needed to reside
upon and cultivate the land for four consecutive years. Oregon Donation
Land Act, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496, 497 (1850). Congress erred, however, in
passing the Act when it described all the lands in the Oregon Territory as
being public lands of the United States because the Cush-Hook Nation
never relinquished their claim to the land, nor did the United States
extinguish the Nation’s aboriginal title.
Nonetheless, Joe and Elsie Meek, two American settlers, applied for and
received fee title to 640 acres of land that today encompasses the CushHook village despite failing to meet the explicit conditions to properly
obtain the land title in accordance with the Act. The Meeks’ descendants
sold the land to Oregon in 1880 and Oregon proceeded to create the Kelley
Point Park. The Meeks should have never received title to the land because
they failed to live on the land for more than two years, and never cultivated
the land, hence, failing to meet the conditions of the Act. See Hall v.
Russell, 101 U.S. 503, 504 (1880). Therefore, the lower court was correct
in holding that the United States’ grant of fee simple title to the land at
issue to the Meeks under the Oregon Donation Land Act was void ab initio
and that the subsequent sale of the land by the Meek’s descendants to the
State of Oregon was also void. Thus, the land therefore still resides within
the jurisdiction of the federal government and Oregon is precluded from
asserting its criminal jurisdiction over Captain’s activities on federal land.
The State of Oregon is a Public Law 280 state, which allows the State to
extend its criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country. If the land in
question is not found to be federal land outright, then it fits the
qualifications for “Indian country.” While Public Law 280 clearly provides
that the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act no longer applied in
those regions, federal power to enforce federal laws of general applicability
remains. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (2012). Crimes of general applicability
remained within the subject matter of the federal courts despite the passage
of Public Law 280 and its delegation of criminal jurisdiction to certain
states. See, e.g., United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Further, a fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has
the power to preempt state law. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2). Oregon has no
authority to assert jurisdiction over Thomas Captain in Indian country
because its laws are preempted by two federal statutes, the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act (“ARPA” hereinafter) and Native American
Grave and Protection Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA” hereinafter).
Congress passed ARPA in 1979, in part, to “secure, for the present and
future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological
resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 470aa(b) (2012). In 1990, Congress enacted NAGPRA, in part, with the
principal objective of establishing a legal regime for the protection of
Native American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and
objects of cultural patrimony presently on federal and tribal lands from
unauthorized excavation or removal.
NAGPRA is “[f]ederal law, and, as such, under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution preempts any state law on the same subject matter. . . . This
is especially true in the field of Federal Indian law, where the United States
has plenary and exclusive power.” Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act Regulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 12,380 (Mar. 15, 2010) (codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 10) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). Additionally, a preemption of state
law need not be explicit—a state’s regulation of a particular field that is so
thoroughly occupied by Congress to exclusion of the states warrants
preemption. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978). The
State of Oregon seeks to tread into an area of law that has clearly been
occupied by the federal government through two congressional acts which
provide a comprehensive legal regime for archaeological and cultural
preservation of sites and resources relating to Native American people. The
Oregon statutes are virtually a recitation of the federal laws, but are limited
in application to the lands that under Oregon’s jurisdiction. Because the
land in question falls under “Indian country,” both ARPA and NAGPRA
preempt Oregon’s laws. A finding that Oregon’s jurisdiction is not
preempted by the operation of federal law would severely interfere with
federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, and Oregon’s interests at
stake do not rise to the sufficient level to assert its authority. Therefore, this
Court should also dismiss Oregon’s claim against Thomas Captain on the
basis that federal law preempts Oregon’s laws on archaeological and
cultural preservation.
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Argument
I. The Cush-Hook Nation Maintains Aboriginal Title to Their Ancestral
Lands Enclosed by Modern-Day Kelley Point Park Because the Federal
Government’s Acquisition of the Land Was Invalid According to Clear
Federal Indian Law Precedent.
A. The Cush-Hook Nation Has Established Aboriginal Title to the Lands
in Question by Its Actual and Exclusive Use and Occupancy of the Land
Prior to the Loss of the Property.
Indian aboriginal title, commonly referred to as the “right of occupancy”
or the “right of possession,” was first recognized in United States
jurisprudence in 1823 in the decision of Johnson v. M’Intosh. Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In Johnson, the Supreme Court
of the United States asserted that “[i]t has never been contended that the
Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been
questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate
title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of
acquiring that right.” Id. at 603. “An Indian tribe establishes aboriginal
title by showing that it has inhabited the land ‘from time immemorial.’”
Greene v. Rhode Island, 398 F.3d 45, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Mashpee
Tribe v. Sec’y of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 481-82 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226,
234 (1985))). The tribe must show “historical evidence of the tribe’s longstanding physical possession” of the land. Greene, 398 F.3d at 49-50
(quoting Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 670, 671 (1989)).
This Court has stated that the “[o]ccupancy necessary to establish
aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be determined as any other
question of fact.” United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339,
345 (1941). The standard of review for questions of fact is the clearly
erroneous standard. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986).
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals properly concluded that the
Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in the modern-day Kelley Point Park
under aboriginal title. COL 4. The Cush-Hook Nation maintains aboriginal
title to the lands in question because it has met the factors set forth by the
Indian Claims Commission Act to establish aboriginal title. From 1946 to
1978, the Indian Claims Commission Act was tasked with hearing claims of
Indian tribes against the United States. An Act of August 13, 1946, ch.
959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). These claims included land disputes where the
court often determined whether a tribe had aboriginal title. See id. At the
termination of this Commission, Indian claims were transferred to the Court
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of Claims where they are presently adjudicated. 28 U.S.C. §1505 (2012).
During the period of the Indian Claims Commission, the Commission
established ways of determining aboriginal title. These factors were laid out
in Otoe & Missouria Tribe v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955). The
court found that:
[C]laimant Indians had established their Indian title by means
of, inter alia, (1) evidence that no other tribes claimed or used
the areas involved and that neighboring tribes recognized these
lands as being the exclusive property of the claimant Indians, (2)
earlier official recognition of the claimants' exclusive Indian title
to the lands, and (3) expert testimony of historians in the field of
American history and statements of government Indian officials,
and the court upheld this decision, noting that the record
contained substantial support for the finding of Indian title.
Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal
Title to Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 425 (1979) (citing Otoe & Missouria
Tribe v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955)). These factors have much in
common with the definition of aboriginal title as existing for tribes from
“time immemorial.” Greene, 398 F.3d at 49-50. The Indian Claims
Commission factors are directly in line with the requirements as set forth by
Johnson v. McIntosh to demonstrate right of occupancy. In Johnson v.
M’Intosh, the Court determined that Indian tribes maintained a “right of
occupancy” interest when they occupied and used land to the exclusion of
others.
See generally Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and
Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 425
(1979) (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 573 (1823)).
In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation has established its aboriginal title by
its occupation, use, and ownership of the land prior to the arrival of the
Euro-Americans. FOF 1. The Cush-Hook Nation first engaged with
William Clark in 1806. During his encounter, Clark documented the
occupation and use of the land by the Nation. He sketched the established
villages and longhouses that occupied the land, and noted the Nation’s
cultural, religious, and traditional practices of the Cush-Hook Nation. This
documentation, coupled with the recognition of the Nation’s homelands by
the neighboring Multnomah Indians, indisputably determines the
establishment of the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land. Thus,
the Cush-Hook Nation fulfills the requirements to establish aboriginal title
and there is no evidence that federal government extinguished that title.
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B. The Cush-Hook Nation’s Aboriginal Title to the Land in Question Still
Exists Today Because It Was Never Extinguished
The court was correct in concluding that the Cush-Hook Nation’s
aboriginal title to its homelands in Kelley Point Park was never
extinguished as required by law. “Aboriginal title is title to land that the
Indians inhabited from time immemorial, which cannot be extinguished
without explicit action by Congress.” Greene v. Rhode Island, 289 F. Supp.
2d 5, 9 (D.R.I. 2003) aff'd, 398 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 234–35). Congress’s failure to extinguish the
Nation’s aboriginal title through any valid method, and the wrongful
displacement of the Nation by the United States without the ratified treaty,
vests aboriginal title to the land in the Nation.
i. The Court Was Correct in Finding That the Cush-Hook Nation’s
Aboriginal Title to the Land Has Never Been Extinguished by Congress
Because There Has Been No Conquest or Purchase.
Indian aboriginal title, though a right that has never been questioned,
may be extinguished by an explicit act of Congress. Santa Fe Pac. R.R.
Co., 314 U.S. at 347. Federal intent to extinguish aboriginal title, must be
clear, but may take various forms. Greene v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 45 (1st.
Cir. 2005). This right gives the United States “exclusive right to extinguish
the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest.” Johnson, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587. However, the Indian right of occupancy shall not
be disturbed without the tribe’s “free consent.” Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 55 (1831).
The United States could have extinguished the Cush-Hook Nation’s title
by conquest. This Court has stated that “[c]onquest gives a title which the
courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted.” Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
Though an extinguishment of the Nation’s title by the United States through
conquest is a proper method of extinguishment, the United States never
took this course of action. To the contrary, Lewis gifted “sovereignty
tokens” to the Cush-Hook Nation’s chief, an act that has been historically
noted to have political and diplomatic significance. Because there was no
method of federal recognition at the time of Clark’s discovery of the
Nation, the process of sovereignty tokens was such that established a
relationship between the existing tribes in the lands which were
encountered by the Americans and the sovereign United States.
Accordingly, the Cush-Hook Nation’s title was never extinguished by
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conquest and the Cush-Hook Nation continues to possess its aboriginal title
to the land.
Just as it is clear that the Cush-Hook Nation’s title was never
extinguished by conquest, the aboriginal title was also never extinguished
by purchase. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the court stated that Indians “were
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion.” Id. at 574. This title, however, was purchasable by the
sovereign with the consent of the tribe, at the price the tribe was willing to
take, without coercion. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 517
(1832), abrogated on other grounds by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001). Thus, Congress could approve the United States’ purchase of the
Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title so long as the tribe consented to the
sale at an agreeable price and without coercion. In order for a treaty to be
valid, the Senate must ratify the treaty. However, the executive branch,
which includes executive officers such as Anson Dart, was responsible for
the initiation of the process of creating and negotiating these treaties with
tribes. Karuk Tribe v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000). At
the time that the Cush-Hook Nation was negotiating its treaty with the
United States, many executive officials were doing the same in various
parts of the western United States. Id. In many of these cases, the
executives acted upon these treaties despite the Senate’s failure to ratify
them, “render[ing] them legal nullities.” Id.
The same circumstances exist in the present case. Anson Dart negotiated
a treaty with the Nation where the Nation agreed to sell its aboriginal title to
the United States with the expectation that they would receive
compensation for the lands in and around modern-day Kelley Point Park,
recognized ownership of the lands to which they moved, and other
promised treaty benefits. ROA at 2. Under this agreement, the Cush-Hook
Nation’s title would have been extinguished by purchase because there was
consent by the Nation to sell at a willing price and without coercion.
However, that is not the actual case. Rather, the Nation was misled to
believe that the treaty benefits would flow from the extinguishment of the
aboriginal title, but Congress’ failure to ratify the treaty voided the treaty
altogether. Thus, the Cush-Hook Nation’s right of occupancy and
aboriginal title could not have been and was not extinguished by purchase.
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ii. Even Though Congress Has Extended Extinguishment to Include
Explicit Extinguishment, the United States Never Explicitly Extinguished
the Cush-Hook Nation’s Aboriginal Title and Therefore the Tribe Has
Retained Aboriginal Title.
The final way that this Court recognizes that Congress has terminated a
tribe’s aboriginal title is through an explicit extinguishment. This Court has
held that “extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed
solicitude of the Federal Government for the welfare of its Indian wards.”
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 354. Congress is the branch of
government that has the absolute authority to extinguish aboriginal title.
Thus, Congress’ failure to ratify the treaty with the Nation is a clear
indication that Congress never meant to extinguish the aboriginal title and
therefore the Cush Hook Nation still retains Indian title to the land. In the
treaty between the United States and the Cush-Hook Nation, the United
States promised benefits such as federal recognition and a reservation for
their continued living in a new location in exchange for their claims to the
land at issue. However, Congress refused to ratify this treaty, thereby
preserving the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land.
This Court has held that agreements between the United States and
Indians “are to be liberally interpreted to accomplish their protective
purposes, with ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the Indians.”
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). The treaty included
provisions such as “promised compensation for [the Nation’s] lands in and
around modern-day Kelley Point Park . . . and other promised benefits of
the treaty, and the recognized ownership of the lands in return for the
Nation agreeing to move to the lands in the coast range of mountains.”
ROA at 2. In order to comply with Carpenter, these provisions must be
interpreted in favor of the Cush-Hook Nation. “A treaty, including one
between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract
between two sovereign nations.” Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979). Because it is
clear that the Cush-Hook Nation wanted to establish a political and
diplomatic relationship with the United States by accepting the sovereignty
tokens and entering into a treaty, the only just way to interpret these
ambiguities is to have the treaty “construed as [it was] understood by the
tribal representatives who participated in their negotiation.” Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation expected that this treaty would
establish rights and benefits for them as a tribe in exchange for the
extinguishment of their aboriginal title. The Nation’s land was in a prime
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location at the confluence of two major rivers. ROA at 1. The Cush-Hook
Nation was willing to extinguish its aboriginal title only because it expected
to receive ownership rights to another piece of land, other promised benefits
including federal recognition, and monetary compensation in return. ROA
at 2. By interpreting the treaty as it should be, in favor of Indians, the
subsequent refusal of ratification is the opposite of an explicit congressional
act of extinguishment. In fact, by refusing to ratify a treaty that would
explicitly extinguish aboriginal title, Congress did not extinguish the CushHook Nation’s aboriginal title. Thus, the tribe maintains their title to the
lands in Kelley Point Park.
Even if this Court finds that Congress's failure to ratify the treaty is not a
clear indication of the Nation’s continued claim to aboriginal title, the
Cush-Hook Nation retains aboriginal title because Congress has never
explicitly extinguished Indian title as required by its “avowed solicitude. . .
for the welfare of its Indian wards.” See United States v. Santa Fe Pac.
R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 354. The circuit court correctly concluded that
“Congress erred in the Oregon Donation Land Act when it described all the
lands in the Oregon Territory as being public lands of the United States.”
COL 1. In the Oregon Donation Land Act of 1850, Congress declared that
“every white settler” living on “public lands” that had “resided upon and
cultivated the [land] for four consecutive years” was to be granted fee
simple title to the land. Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496,
497 (1850). However, by deeming the lands in Kelley Point Park as
eligible under the Act, not only did Congress err because the Cush-Hook
Nation had aboriginal title to the lands, but Congress did not expressly
extinguish the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title.
Historically, Congress has expressly extinguished aboriginal title, as
evidenced in the Alaska Native Settlement Act (“ANSA” hereinafter).
ANSA explicitly stated that “[a]ll aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of
aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including submerged
land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and including any
aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby
extinguished.” 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). The Ninth Circuit upheld this
extinguishment and stated, “We hold that the [aforementioned] Act
extinguished not only the aboriginal titles of all Alaska Natives, but also
every claim ‘based on’ aboriginal title in the sense that the past or present
existence of aboriginal title is an element of the claim.” United States v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1980). This is an example
of Congress’s explicit extinguishment of a claim of aboriginal title, which is
not evident in the present case. At best, the Oregon Donation Land Act was
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an act to define the uses of public lands, not those lands which retained
unextinguished aboriginal title. This Act did not make any mention of
Indian title nor did it make any reference to the extinguishment of Indian
aboriginal title. Congress is apprised of the standard for extinguishment of
Indian title, as expressed in the Alaska Native Settlement Act, and yet it
took none of those measures when creating the Oregon Donation Land Act.
Thus, the Cush-Hook Nation maintains aboriginal title because its title has
not been extinguished by Congress in any way.
iii. The Cush-Hook Nation Never Relinquished Its Title by Abandonment
Because Anson Dart Wrongfully Displaced the Cush-Hook Nation from
Its Aboriginal Lands.
“Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their
habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual
possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its
exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as
much respected until they abandoned them, made a cession to the
government, or an authorized sale to individuals. . . . In either case their
rights became extinct. . . .” Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711,
746 (1835) (emphasis added).
Abandonment has long been regarded as the way in which an Indian
tribe may voluntarily extinguish its aboriginal title to its lands. See id.
Abandonment is not an involuntary act but one that requires volition and
consent to constitute an extinguishment of aboriginal title. The act of
moving off tribal lands is only seen as an abandonment when there are
“specific circumstances to warrant that conclusion.” Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 945 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
Further, “the unilateral action of an officer of the executive branch cannot
eliminate Indian title.” Id.
Though the Cush-Hook Nation moved from its aboriginal lands, their
alleged “abandonment” was not voluntary, but rather a wrongful
displacement under false pretenses. After the treaty failed to be ratified, the
United States took no documented measures to show that it informed the
Cush-Hook Nation of their wrongful displacement, and there is no evidence
that the Nation’s failure to return to the land was voluntary.
In Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U.S. 55 (1886), this Court
recognized Indian land abandonment when a treaty signed by a tribe to cede
its aboriginal lands did not take effect until the tribe moved to a reservation
set aside for them by the United States. Id. at 70. This Court found that
“[t]he relinquishment thus made was as effectual as a formal act of cession.
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Their right of occupancy was, in effect, abandoned; and, full consideration
for it being afterwards paid, it could not be resumed.” Id. at 69-70. This
Court held that the tribe’s relinquishment of its aboriginal title,
accompanied by the treaty recognizing its cession, “may properly be treated
as establishing the extinguishment of their title from its date, so far as the
United States are concerned.” Id. at 70.
Further, Congress never ratified a treaty recognizing cession or a formal
relinquishment of the Nation’s land for which consideration was paid. The
Cush-Hook Nation signed the treaty and abided by its terms because it
believed the agreement to be valid. Thus, it is clear that the mere actions of
Anson Dart, an officer of the executive, did not constitute extinguishment.
See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 490 F.2d at 945.
Additionally, the relocation of the Cush-Hook Nation pursuant to the
treaty with Anson Dart was not an extinguishment of the Nation’s title to
the lands in Kelley Point Park because a relinquishment alone does not
constitute abandonment for the purposes of extinguishment of Indian title.
The members of the Cush-Hook Nation moved to the new land because
they were operating under the contract that they had made with Anson Dart.
Though Anson Dart had the authority to negotiate treaties with Indian tribes
pursuant to the Act Authorizing the Negotiation of Treaties with the Indian
Tribes in the Territory of Oregon, he did not have the authority to carry out
the removal of the Cush-Hook Nation without congressional approval.
Thus, the abandonment was not voluntary and did not constitute an
extinguishment of the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title. An Act
Authorizing the Negotiation of Treaties with the Indian Tribes in the
Territory of Oregon, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437, 437 (1850). Therefore, the CushHook Nation retained Indian title, which was never extinguished because
the Nation established it, Congress never extinguished it, and the Nation
never abandoned it.
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II. Oregon Is Precluded From Asserting Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Thomas Captain for Excavating and Removing Sacred Objects Because the
Objects Are Located Within Federal Lands and Are Subject to Federal
Laws.
A. The Cush-Hook Nation’s Homelands Situated in Kelley Point Park
Are Under Federal Jurisdiction and Not Owned by the State of Oregon
Because Congress Erred in the Oregon Donation Land Act When It
Deemed All Lands as Being “Public,” Voiding Any Subsequent
Conveyance of the Land.
The Oregon Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Or. Rev. Stat.
358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 applied to all lands in
the State of Oregon under Public Law 280, whether the lands were tribally
owned or not. Public Law 280 only applies the laws of Oregon to those
lands defined as “Indian Country,” not all federal lands. In this case, the
land in modern-day Kelley Point Park is federal land and not subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of Oregon, notwithstanding the extension of
Oregon’s jurisdiction through Public Law 280.
i. The Oregon Court of Appeals Was Correct in Determining that the
Cush-Hook Nation’s Homelands Cannot Be Considered “Public Lands”
Subject to Alienation to the Meeks, or Subsequently the State of Oregon,
Under the Oregon Donation Land Act.
The lower court properly held that Congress erred in promulgating the
Oregon Donation Land Act when it described all the lands in the Oregon
Territory as being “public lands” of the United States. COL 1. As
discussed earlier, the Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in question under
aboriginal title because its aboriginal title has never been
extinguished. COL 2, 5.
In 1850, Congress passed the Oregon Donation Land Act to stimulate
white settler movements into the fledgling territory that was occupied by
Indian tribes. See generally Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496
(1850). Earlier legislation, however, necessitated that Indian title to land be
extinguished before land could become part of the public domain. When
Congress passed the Oregon Territorial Act of 1848 establishing, inter alia,
the Territory of Oregon, the Act guaranteed Indians rights to their
homelands “so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty
between the United States and such Indians.” Act to Establish the
Territorial Government of Oregon, ch. 177, § 1, 9 Stat. 323, 323 (1848).
Prior to passing the Oregon Donation Land Act, Congress enacted a law
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that authorized the appointment of commissioners to negotiate treaties with
Oregon tribes “for the Extinguishment of their Claims to Lands lying west
of the Cascade Mountains.” An Act Authorizing the Negotiation of
Treaties with the Indian Tribes in the Territory of Oregon, 9 Stat. at 437.
Additionally, the Act gave the commissioners the discretion to remove all
these small tribes and leave the whole of the most desirable portion open to
white settlers. Id. Consequently, the majority of the Territory of Oregon
was entered into the public domain as a result of the confiscation of Indian
land through the treaty process.
In this case, the Cush-Hook Nation’s retention of aboriginal title
prevents the declaration of those lands as public. Although Anson Dart
negotiated with the Cush-Hook Nation to relocate sixty miles westward,
this was in exchange of land, promised benefits, and compensation. Id. If
the Senate had indeed ratified this treaty, its declaration of the lands as
public would have been in accordance with the extinguishment of
aboriginal title by a ratified treaty. However, the U.S. Senate refused to
ratify the treaty and the Cush-Hook Nation’s aboriginal title to the land was
not extinguished. Therefore, the lands in Kelley Point Park could not have
been deemed public and conveyed to the Meeks, or subsequently to the
State of Oregon, through the Oregon Donation Land Act.
ii. Because the Meeks’ Sale of Land to Oregon Was Void Ab Initio, the
Meeks Never Gained Lawful Title to the Land Through the Oregon
Donation Land Act, and the Land Still Remains Under Federal
Jurisdiction.
The Oregon Donation Land Act allowed an adult white male to claim up
to 320 acres of land for himself, and, if he were married, another 320 acres
in his wife’s name, so long as he resided on and cultivated the land for four
consecutive years. See Oregon Donation Land Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496
(1850).
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized that although a fee simple
title vests in the donors for lands of a “donation claim” from the date of
their settlement, this title is subject to be defeated by non-compliance with
the conditions expressed in the Oregon Donation Land Act. McKay v.
Freeman, 6 Or. 449, 452-53 (1877). Thus, a failure to meet the conditions
of the Oregon Donation Land Act rendered the fee simple title invalid and
reverted title back to the United States. See generally id.
This Court has recognized a settler’s failure to comply with Section 4 of
the Oregon Donation Land Act barred him from passing title to the land to
his heirs. In Hall v. Russell, the question before the court was whether the
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heirs of a settler could receive lands passed by will from a settler who died
before the expiration of the four-year residence and cultivation requirement.
Hall v. Russell, 101 U.S. 503, 504 (1880). In 1852, devisor settled on the
land in dispute with a view to becoming its owner under the operation of
the Oregon Donation Land Act. Id. at 503-04. Devisor met the
qualifications necessary to enable him to initially take and hold land under
the Act. Id. However, he died without fulfilling the qualifications
necessary to perfect title, but nonetheless left a will devising his estate to
his heirs. Id. If the Court found that the land patent descended from the
devisor, despite his failure to fulfill the requirements, then the devisor
would have had a devisable estate. Hall, 101 U.S. at 504. However, the
Court concluded that when devisor died, he had nothing in the land which
he could transmit to his heirs, so that anything the heirs received came from
the United States. Id. at 513-14. Therefore, the heirs could not obtain the
legal tract of land because it reverted back to the federal government, which
subsequently vested ownership in another settler who fulfilled the
requirement. Id.
In the present case, the Meeks failed to fulfill the terms of the Oregon
Donation Land Act and did not obtain legal title to the land. See id. at 504.
The Meeks failed to meet the Act’s requirements and thus the title reverted
back to the federal government, which retained the title just as it did in
Hall. See id. Therefore, the Meeks could not transfer any title to their
descendants because they had no title to transfer as a result of having had
their title defeated by failure to comply with the requirements. McKay, 6
Or. at 452-53.
The State of Oregon does not own the land where Captain acquired the
sacred totem. Rather, the federal government still retains ownership over
the land because, as the lower court concluded, the United States’ grant of
fee simple title to the land at issue to the Meeks was void ab initio because
the Meeks did not fulfill the explicit conditions of the Oregon Donation
Land Act. ROA at 2. Hence, the grant of the land to the Meeks’
descendants and subsequent sale of land to State of Oregon was also void
because the Meeks did not have proper title. COL 3; ROA at 2. Because
the land reverted back to the federal government’s jurisdiction when the
Meeks failed to satisfy the conditions of the Oregon Donation Land Act, the
lands remain under federal jurisdiction and Oregon’s laws relating to
archaeological sites do not govern Captain’s actions on federal lands.
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B. Even if the Land in Question Is Considered “Indian Country,”
Oregon’s Laws Are Preempted by Federal Law, Notwithstanding Public
Law 280, and the State Does Not Have Criminal Jurisdiction over
Captain’s Use and Removal of the Cush-Hook Nation’s Sacred Objects.
i. Under Montoya, the Cush-Hook Nation Is an “Indian Tribe” of Which
Thomas Captain Is a Member, and the Nation’s Existing Aboriginal Title
to the Land in Question Qualifies the Land as “Indian Country.”
In Montoya v. United States, this Court has held that an Indian tribe is “a
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under
one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes
ill-defined territory.” Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
The Cush-Hook Nation qualifies as an “Indian tribe” because its members
are of a similar race, united in a community under one chief, and once
inhabited a defined territory. Further, the Cush-Hook Nation is the only
Native tribe to the defined territory of modern-day Kelley Point Park. ROA
at 2. According to Clark’s journal records, Clark was escorted by the
Multnomah Indians to the established Cush-Hook Nation village and
longhouses, which provides evidence that the Nation inhabited a particular,
defined area. ROA at 1. Clark gave the Cush-Hook chief “sovereignty
tokens,” which demonstrated the United States’ desire to engage in political
and diplomatic relations with the Nation and symbolized that tribal leaders
and governments would be recognized by the United States. It is clear
through the facts that the Cush-Hook Nation existed in the territory since
time immemorial and its members were all of the same race, governed by a
chief, and living within a clearly demarcated territory as drawn by Clark
and recognized by the Multnomah tribe. Therefore, the Cush-Hook Nation
constitutes a tribe pursuant to the definition set forth by Montoya, though
admittedly not federally recognized according to the 1994 tribal list act.
FOF 3.
As a citizen of the Cush-Hook Nation, Captain is therefore considered an
“Indian.” See ROA at 2. The Ninth Circuit established that the test for
determining whether one is an Indian, for purposes of Public Law 280, is to
determine the “degree of Indian blood” and the “tribal or governmental
recognition as an Indian.” United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260,
1263 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 849; see also United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). “A person may still be an Indian
though not enrolled with a recognized tribe.” St. Cloud v. United States,
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988) (citing Broncheau, 597 F.2d at
1263; United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir.1974). Given
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Captain’s status as a citizen of the Cush-Hook Nation and descendent of the
Cush-Hook’s ancestors, he may be considered an “Indian” for the purposes
of determining whether the State of Oregon can assert jurisdiction over him.
Regarding the status of the land in question, Congress has broadly
defined “Indian country” to include, inter alia, formal and informal
reservations (notwithstanding the issuance of any patent). Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124 (1993); United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151). This Court has
held that the term “Indian Country” also embraces all land within the
United States to which the aboriginal title has never been extinguished. See
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1883)). The term “Indian
country” is used generally to describe land in the occupation of the Indians,
to which their title or right of occupancy has not been extinguished. See id.
As established earlier, the Cush-Hook Nation owns the land in question
under aboriginal title. Even if this Court finds that lands situated in
modern-day Kelley Point Park do not fall exclusively under the ownership
of the federal government, the lands are certainly considered part of “Indian
country” for jurisdictional purposes.
Accordingly, the State of Oregon does not have criminal jurisdiction
over Captain for the acts committed because notwithstanding Oregon’s
incorrect expansion of authority under Public Law 280, Oregon’s statutes
relating to the protection of archaeological sites and cultural objects are
preempted by federal law.
ii. Under the Principles of Federal Preemption, Congress Intended the
ARPA and NAGPRA to “Occupy the Field” of Law with Respect to
Archaeological Preservation of Native American Sites and Artifacts on
Federal and Indian Land, Thereby Preempting Oregon’s Statutes.
As stated earlier, Public Law 280 gave six states, including Oregon,
extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006). Additionally,
Public Law 280 clearly provides that the General Crimes Act (25 U.S.C. §
1152) and the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153) no longer applied in
those regions. Id. § 1162(c). Federal power to enforce those two statutes
was fully supplanted by the power of the mandatory Public 280 states in the
areas over which they were granted jurisdiction. Nonetheless, federal
power to enforce federal laws of general applicability—actions that
Congress has declared illegal regardless of where they occur—remains
even though the amendment to Public Law 280 refers to the “exclusive”
authority of the States over conduct that falls within the scope of the Major
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Crimes or General Crimes Acts. See United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d
1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2004); see 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c). For example, the
court in United States v. Wadena, held that crimes of general applicability
remained within the subject matter of the federal courts despite the passage
of Public Law 280 and its delegation of criminal jurisdiction to certain
states. 152 F.3d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1998). In that case, the chairman,
treasurer, and councilman of the White Earth Reservation Tribal Council
were convicted in federal court of many crimes related to the
misapplication of tribal funds. Id. at 837. On review, the Eighth Circuit
summarily rejected the assertion that under Public Law 280, the federal
government had surrendered to Minnesota its criminal jurisdiction over all
federal offenses committed on Indian lands. The court reiterated that
crimes of general applicability were not affected by the enactment of Public
Law 280 and remained within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Id. at 842.
Since Public Law 280, Congress has passed two significant and
extensive laws of general applicability that govern the archaeological
preservation of culturally significant sites and resources. The purpose and
intent behind these pieces of legislation indicates that Congress sought to
have exclusive authority over this area of law, particularly with respect to
remains, sites, and objects of Native American tribes.
In 1979, Congress passed Archaeological Resources Protection Act, in
part, to “secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people,
the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public
lands and Indian lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2012). The primary
motivation behind ARPA was the need to provide more effective law
enforcement to protect archaeological sites.
ARPA defines an
“archaeological resource” as “any material remains of past human life or
activities which are at least 100 years of age, and which are of
archaeological interest.” 43 C.F.R. § 7.1(a) (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1)
(2012). ARPA defines “public lands,” inter alia, as the “lands the fee title
to which is held by the United States.” Id. § 470bb(3)(B). “Indian lands”
are defined as “lands of Indian tribes, or Indian individuals, which are either
held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States. Id. § 470bb(4).
ARPA states that an Indian tribe or member thereof is not required to
obtain a permit for the excavation or removal of any archaeological
resources located on Indian lands of such Indian tribe. 16 U.S.C. §
470cc(g)(1). The exception to this general rule states that an individual is
required to obtain a permit in the absence of tribal law regulating the
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excavation or removal of archaeological resources on Indian lands. Id.
Section 6 of ARPA details the range of prohibited activities, including
removal, damage, or defacement in addition to unpermitted excavation or
removal. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a).
Shortly after the passage of the ARPA, Congress enacted the Native
American Grave and Protection Repatriation Act with the principle
objective of establishing a legal regime for the protection of Native
American human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony presently on federal and tribal lands from unauthorized
excavation or removal. United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799-800
(10th Cir. 1997) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 101-877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368) (emphasis added). In
addition to repatriation and graves protection, NAGPRA also establishes a
criminal prohibition on trafficking in Native American human remains and
cultural items in violation of the statute. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1170
(2012) (emphasis added). The law provides that Indian tribes or
descendants of the deceased have the ownership and control over human
remains and cultural items which are excavated on federal lands when 1)
lineal descendancy or cultural affiliation can be shown; 2) tribal land is
involved; or 3) where an Indian tribe has successfully obtained a land
claims judgment establishing that a given piece of federal land was within
its aboriginal territory. 25 U.S.C. 3002(a) (2012).
NAGPRA defines “sacred objects” as “specific ceremonial objects which
are needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice
of traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents.” 25
U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C). A literal reading of this definition reveals that any
artifact deemed a “sacred object” must be connected to the practice of an
American Indian religion by present-day peoples. Bonnichsen v. United
States, 367 F.3d 864, 879 (9th Cir. 2004).
According to NAGPRA, the intentional excavation of sacred objects and
objects of cultural patrimony from federal land is allowed only if 1) the
objects are excavated or removed following the requirements of ARPA, 2)
the objects are excavated after consultation with or, in the case of tribal
lands, consent of, the appropriate Indian tribe, 3) disposition of the objects
is consistent with their custody, and 4) proof of the consultation or consent
is shown to the Federal agency official responsible for issuing the required
permit. 43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2006).
Passed in 1993, three years after the enactment of NAGPRA, Or. Rev.
Stat. 358.905-358.961 were in enacted and provide, in part, definitions of
terms, types of prohibited conduct along with exceptions, and criminal
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enforcement procedures relating to archaeological objects and sites. Or.
Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240 explains that an individual is required to first
obtain a permit in order to excavate or remove archaeological and historical
material on public lands or otherwise is subject to criminal penalty. The
Oregon statute defines an “archaeological object” and a “sacred object” in
the same manner as the definitions in ARPA and NAGPRA, respectively.
Or. Rev. Stat. 358.905-358.961 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. 390.235-390.240
(2011). A person must first obtain a permit to either excavate or alter an
archaeological site on public lands or remove from public lands any
material of an archaeological, historical, prehistoric, or anthropological
nature, and failure to obtain a permit results in a Class B misdemeanor. Or.
Rev. Stat § 390.325(7). If an individual excavates or removes from the land
any materials of archaeological, historical, prehistoric, or anthropological
nature without obtaining the required permit, any native Indian human
remains, funerary goods, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony
must be returned to the appropriate Indian tribe. Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.237.
A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the
power to preempt state law. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2). Consideration of
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause “starts with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . .
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). However, Congress often
does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to preempt state
laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of
the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would
frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of
the circumstances that federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field
as to make it reasonable that Congress sought to occupy the field to the
exclusion of the States. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978); Rice, 331 U.S. at 239. This Court has found that even when a State
law is not in direct conflict with a Federal law, the State law could still be
found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the “state law is an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress’ full purposes
and objectives.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. When Congress intends federal
law to “occupy the field,” state law in that area is preempted. Id. at 372.
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, this Court has stated that
although a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is
preempted under familiar principles of preemption, preemption of state
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laws affecting Indian tribes should not be limited only to those
circumstances given the “unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty”
and the “federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency and selfdetermination.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
334 (1983). Additionally, this Court has “rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone” and that
“preemption requires an express congressional statement to that effect.” Id.
Rather, this Court has stated that the preemption analysis should rest
principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing interests at
stake, offering the following rule: state jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. See id.
The Oregon Court of Appeals erred in affirming that Oregon statutes
regarding the excavation or removal of archaeological or historical material
are applicable to the Cush- Hook Nation’s sacred totems located within
Kelley Point Park because application of the statutes was preempted by
federal law. Captain moved back into the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral
homelands in modern-day Kelley Point Park, in part, to protect trees aging
over 300 years old that are culturally and religiously significant to the
Cush-Hook Nation. ROA at 2. The trees are considered critical to the
Cush-Hook religion and culture because tribal shamans carved totem and
religious symbols into living trees hundreds of years ago, which was
verified in Clark’s journal descriptions from 1806. ROA at 2. As the lower
court correctly found, the tree that Thomas Captain cut down was of
archaeological, cultural, and historical significance because it represented a
tribal cultural and religious symbol. FOF 7. Despite the inherent value of
these sacred totems, the State did nothing to stop vandals from defacing the
images and cutting them off the trees to sell. ROA at 2. In response to the
State’s failure to protect the images, Captain sought to restore and protect a
vandalized image that had been carved by one of his ancestors by cutting
the tree down and removing the section of the tree which contained the
image. ROA at 2.
There is clear evidence that Congress intended NAGPRA to be the
“supreme law of the land.” The 2010 Federal Register states that
“NAGPRA is Federal law, and, as such, under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution preempts any state law on the same subject matter . . . This is
especially true in the field of Federal Indian law, where the United States
has plenary and exclusive power.” 43 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2006) (citing U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
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The Oregon statutes seek to tread into an area of law that has clearly
been occupied by the federal government through two congressional acts
that provide a comprehensive legal regime for archaeological and cultural
preservation of sites and resources relating to Native American people.
Oregon law states that “a person may not excavate, injure, destroy, or alter
an archaeological site or object or remove an archaeological object on
public or private lands in Oregon unless that activity is authorized by a
permit.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.920(1)(a) (2011). “Public lands” means “any
lands owned by the State of Oregon, a city, county, district, or municipal or
public corporation in Oregon.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.905(1)(j) (2011).
However, because Kelley Point Park is actually considered “Indian
country” and not under the State’s ownership, Oregon seeks to exert its
authority over land which is outside the confines of its statutory limits. Or.
Rev. Stat. § 358.905 provides definitions for “archaeological object” and
“sacred object” that are nearly identical to the definitions of those words in
ARPA and NAGPRA, respectively. Additionally, the State of Oregon’s
attempt to require the acquisition of permits through the State Parks and
Recreation Department directly conflicts with ARPA’s requirement to
obtain a permit for the use, removal, or excavation of essentially the same
archaeological artifacts and objects. Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.235(1)(a).
This Court should reaffirm its holding in Mescalero Apache Tribe and
declare that the State of Oregon is without jurisdiction to exercise its
authority in this area of law because the Oregon statutes are preempted by
federal law and the federal government has a “commitment to tribal selfsufficiency and self-determination” that would be comprised by an
interjection of state authority. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at
334. Following the analysis set forth by this Court in Mescalero Apache
Tribe, Oregon’s jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law
because it interferes with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law,
and there is no sufficient state interest at stake to justify the assertion of
Oregon’s authority. This is clearly demonstrated by Oregon’s failure to
stop the recent acts of vandalism that have resulted in the defacing, theft,
and trafficking of the Cush-Hook Nation’s sacred totems, which the State
now claims it will protect. ROA at 2. Even if Congress has not clearly
stated an intention to preempt state laws, the evidence above makes clear
that from the totality of the circumstances, federal law so thoroughly
occupies this legislative field as to make it reasonable that Congress sought
to occupy the field, and the existence of conflicting state laws would
frustrate the federal body of law regarding the preservation of
archaeological, cultural, and historical objects relating to Native American
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tribes. See Malone, 435 U.S. at 504; Rice, 331 U.S. at 239. Therefore, we
ask this Court overturn the lower court’s ruling that Thomas Captain is
guilty for violating Or. Rev. Stat. § 358.905-358.961 and Or. Rev. Stat
§ 390.235-390.240 on the grounds that Oregon does not have criminal
jurisdiction to control the uses of, and to protect, the archaeological,
cultural, and historical objects on the Cush-Hook Nation’s ancestral
homelands situated in modern-day Kelley Point Park because Oregon’s
laws are preempted by federal law.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, Thomas Captain respectfully requests this
Court to uphold the decision in part and reverse in part.
The Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold the Cush-Hook
Nation’s establishment and current exercise of aboriginal title to the lands
in Kelley Point Park was correct and should be upheld. The Cush-Hook
Nation has established aboriginal title to the lands and Congress has not
extinguished this title through purchase, conquest or explicit action.
Additionally, the relocation of the Cush-Hook Nation did not constitute
abandonment of the Nation’s aboriginal title. Thus, the land remains under
the aboriginal title of the Cush-Hook Nation and should be affirmed.
Further, Thomas Captain respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
Oregon Court of Appeals with respect to state government’s alleged
criminal jurisdiction to control the uses of, and to protect, archaeological,
cultural, and historical objects on the land in Kelley Point Park. The land at
issue is not under the jurisdiction of the State of Oregon because it is
federal land. Accordingly, Oregon Court of Appeals erred in its application
of the state regulatory laws through Public Law 280 and its decision should
be overturned.
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